TI-games I: An exploration of Type Indeterminacy in strategic decision-making

The Type Indeterminacy model is a theoretical framework that formalizes the constructive preference perspective suggested by Kahneman and Tversky. In this paper we explore an extention of the TI-model from simple to strategic decision-making. A 2X2 game is investigated. We first show that in a one-shot simultaneaous move setting the TI-model is equivalent to a standard incomplete information model. We then let the game be preceded by a cheap-talk promise exchange game. We show in an example that in the TI-model the promise stage can have impact on next following behavior when the standard classical model predicts no impact whatsoever. The TI approach differs from other behavioral approaches in identifying the source of the effect of cheap-talk promises in the intrinsic indeterminacy of the players' type.quantum indeterminacy ; type ; strategic decision-making ; game

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The purpose of this article is to provide a foundation for a more formal, systematic, and integrative approach to function learning that parallels the existing progress in category learning. First, we note limitations of existing formal theories. Next, we develop several potential formal models of function learning, which include expansion of classic rule-based approaches and associative-based models. We specify for the first time psychologically based learning mechanisms for the rule models. We then present new, rigorous tests of these competing models that take into account order of difficulty for learning different function forms and extrapolation performance. Critically, detailed learning performance was also used to conduct the model evaluations. The results favor a hybrid model that combines associative learning of trained input-prediction pairs with a rule-based output response for extrapolation (EXAM)